

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
 OA/Box: Box 2
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 FOIA ID: F2004-075, Hellerman
 Date: 08/03/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Alton Frye to H. Baker, re <i>Meet the Press</i> with Gyorgy Arbatov (page 1, partial)	12/3/87	B6
2. talking points	for President's use in calls to key Senators, 1p	n.d.	B1
3. cable	<p>R 11/9/06 F 04-07 #5</p> <p>231602Z NOV 87, 2p</p> <p>R 8/15/06 PLR204-075 #6</p>	11/23/87	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
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- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1987

Senator,

On January 10, 1979 you met with Georgiy
Arbatov in Moscow (per Bill Hildenbrand).

SUE WALKUP
Office of the Chief of Staff

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ALTON FRYE
Washington Director

December 4, 1987

The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Howard:

Sometimes technology helps politics along. A colleague and I have framed a technical solution for the problem of handling sea-launched cruise missiles in relation to strategic arms reductions.

In order to meet the American requirement to maintain a mixed force of conventional and nuclear armed SLCMs, we are proposing to use permissive action link devices to guarantee that conventional SLCMs are not converted to nuclear SLCMs.

In brainstorming this concept with Evgeny Velikhov (who is here to be a principal technical advisor to Gorbachev), we find him very excited about the idea and eager to discuss it in the context of START issues at the summit. At his request, Peter Zimmerman and I are giving him the enclosed paper. Just in case it arises next week, I thought you and your colleagues should be aware of the idea and its origins.

Cordially,



Alton Frye

Enclosure

*Hope your "Meet the Press"
session goes well.*

Permissive Action Links and the SLCM Verification Problem

Although the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be nearing agreement on general provisions for a major reduction in strategic offensive nuclear arms, one category of weapon stands out as being difficult to limit. The long-range nuclear-armed Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) is externally identical to conventionally armed variants. The similarity is so great that verification of a limit on nuclear-armed SLCMs by national technical means appears impossible. Conventional SLCMs for use against surface ships have become essential weapons in both navies, but if there are no effective limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs, growth in their numbers would vitiate reductions in other categories of nuclear weapons. Unless SLCMs are regulated in a mutually acceptable way, they could frustrate goals sought by both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

The critical questions are two: can the two sides devise a satisfactory method to distinguish conventional SLCMs from nuclear SLCMs and can they guarantee that neither side could convert conventional SLCMs into nuclear delivery vehicles? We propose to meet these goals by an application of existing technology -- the so-called Permissive Action Link (PAL) devices which prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons -- to the SLCM verification problem.

1.) Recognizing that full resolution of the SLCM problem will take additional time to negotiate and implement, we suggest that initial SLCM warhead limits be agreed to outside of the framework of 6,000 strategic weapons allocated to each side. Providing the ceiling on SLCMs does not exceed a few hundred, these weapons would not alter the strategic balance nor dissipate the arms control progress made by achieving agreement on the basic 6,000 limit. The SLCM limit could be set forth in a protocol to any framework agreement reached in the near future, with instructions given to complete work on the details of its verification.

2.) In controlling SLCMs three numbers must be known: the total number of missiles produced, the number equipped with conventional weapons and the number equipped with nuclear weapons. Only the third of these need be controlled by agreement, but production monitoring and an initial data base are essential. INF arrangements for monitoring cruise missile factories already provide the basis for such procedures, but would have to be extended to cover Soviet facilities as well.

One could envision packaging all SLCMs in a tamper-resistant shroud which could be tagged and verified. It is, however, relatively easy to exchange an uncontrolled conventional warhead for a nuclear one. For that reason the main requirement is to encapsulate and seal any SLCM to be counted as conventional, leaving all other SLCMs to be counted as nuclear-armed.

During the past three decades PAL technology has been incorporated into many U.S. nuclear weapons. In principle a PAL is a tamper-resistant seal which denies the use of the weapon to anyone who does not possess the proper access code, but modern PALs are also equipped to destroy the weapons they protect if an attempt is made to defeat the seal. We propose, therefore, that the launching capsules of **conventionally armed** SLCMs be equipped with an equivalent seal incorporating PAL technology and a destruct mechanism. The seal would be emplaced by both the operating and inspecting countries with two separate "keys" (actually numeric codes) required to remove it. Both sides would have the right to make periodic spot checks of conventional SLCMs deployed on ships and of any SLCM moved on or off vessels in port for maintenance.

The PAL seal must not interfere with the weapon if it is fired. Its sole function would be to prevent conversion of a conventional SLCM to a nuclear-armed missile. It must also be completely passive, containing no radio emitting circuitry which could betray the location of the launch platform. If the seal did not meet these requirements, the operating country could not accept it as a part of its weapons. On the other hand, the inspecting country must be certain that the seal cannot be removed. Co-operation will be necessary.

As one possibility, the operating country could design the seal and destruct mechanisms and then contract for their construction with the inspecting country. The inspecting country would produce twice as many seals as were required; half of that output could then be sampled and tested at random by the operating country before its conventional SLCMs were sealed.

As an alternative, the two countries could jointly design, test and manufacture the devices, installing them randomly from a common inventory and under continuous surveillance. Sampling procedures could then confirm that systems installed on both sides' operational forces were functioning as designed.

Very little information about the interior and operating principles of the missiles to be sealed would need to be disclosed to the inspecting side. Indeed, the inspectors would not need to peer beneath the outer skin of the missile nor need to know more than the external dimensions and perhaps the location of one vulnerable spot, the guidance system for example, in order to have confidence that the seal, if tampered with, would render inoperative the missile it protected.

The engineering problems involved in designing the actual hardware should be manageable -- particularly when compared with the political hurdles already overcome. As a technical task, such an approach should be no more formidable than that already achieved in the installation of PALs on nuclear weapons.

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The engineering problems involved in designing the actual hardware should be manageable -- particularly when compared with the political hurdles already overcome. As a technical task, such an approach should be no more formidable than that already achieved in the installation of PALs on nuclear weapons.

Dear Academician Velikhov:

This is a brief written statement of our ideas on applying PAL technology to the SLCM verification problem. We hope you will find it interesting and potentially useful. You are, of course, free to share the paper with your colleagues and to mention our names in connection with it.

We are going to mention this idea to American officials as well in the hope that it might prove mutually worthwhile. Since we only began to develop this idea in the last few days, however, there has been no time for full consideration among knowledgeable analysts. We offer it as a concept for careful study, but do not suggest that any decisions should be taken until further analysis. The more we think about it, the better we like the plan, but it will require much persuasion of interested leaders and institutions in both countries.

We look forward to exploring these subjects with you further.

With best personal wishes.

Sincerely,

P.S. We are also sending along the other paper in which you were interested. It is only a preliminary draft and should not be quoted, but it provides a good context for discussing issues related to cruise missiles.

Memorandum from: ALTON FRYE 12/3

Howard:

As a protocol
point, it is
"Academician Arbatov."

He is one of the few
members of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences
who is not a
physical scientist
or engineer.

Altoy

P.S. I now understand he
will still be in Moscow
on Sunday.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

TO: Howard Baker

December 3, 1987

FROM: Alton Frye

SUBJECT: Meet the Press with Gyorgy Arbatov

BACKGROUND

I understand that Arbatov broke his leg and will now be coming to Washington with Gorbachev, rather than ahead of him. He may be in London when you do the program and I will probably not have a chance to see him before then. I may, however, chat with one or two of his colleagues who will be in touch with him before the program; if I have anything useful to report, I will call you.

Arbatov studied at the Institute of International Relations which has produced many of the leading Soviet diplomats (Dobrynin, Vorontsov, Bessmertnykh) and journalists (Vikenty Matveyev of Izvestia), but he has devoted most of his career to developing the Institute of USA and Canada as a center for research and training. There are tensions between the career diplomats and his Institute professionals, but they work together surprisingly well; Arbatov regularly has some of his own people assigned to the embassy in Washington for training and liaison purposes. (His son, Alexei, is a staff member of another Moscow institute, and is an astute strategic analyst with a growing reputation in both countries --- a lot better on the details and technologies than his father.)

Arbatov's and Dobrynin's proteges are the two main pools of talent on which Soviet leaders draw for knowledge of the United States. To the surprise of some, Dobrynin's return to Moscow has not meant Arbatov's eclipse; Gorbachev seems comfortable taking counsel from both of them.



His tone is often grudging and many Americans resent him, but he has in fact been a force for moderating the harder line Soviet positions. In particular, he has apparently been a real weight in coaxing Gorbachev to relax his initial stiff stand on development and testing of strategic defenses. Largely because Arbatov understands the restraining effects of congressional action on the ABM Treaty and SDI budgets, he seems to have argued for the more modest Soviet approach now unfolding, i.e. tying START reductions to more general commitments not to withdraw from the

ABM Treaty for an extended period, acknowledging wide latitude under the Treaty for exploration of the relevant technologies, admitting that the Soviets are also conducting such programs.

POSSIBLE POINTS FOR PROGRAM

1. Note importance of clear communication between superpowers. Recognize contribution Arbatov has made through his own role as a two-way channel and even more through his Institute's education of hundreds of professionals who know the United States well enough to understand trends here, our values, purposes, and capabilities. The most dangerous thing would be for either country to base its actions on misguided notions about the other side's real character, intentions, and capacities.

2. President Reagan's meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev confirm the necessity for carrying that communication to highest levels. Search for pragmatic solutions to common problems is the enduring obligation of statesmen, especially for statesmen in the nuclear age.

3. Obviously, there are many issues, frictions and difficulties beyond those of arms control and nuclear stability. One standard for judging possible agreements on weapons is whether they facilitate or impede progress in other areas. No one should want an arms deal in one field if it makes conflict more likely in another. We see the INF accord as a solid building block, valuable in its own right and even more useful as a step toward addressing other problems of security. Must manage the threats to security or it is unlikely that we can move on to a more affirmative agenda between our two nations. Security problems are primary.

4. Key question is not whether our interests are identical; they are not. Key question is whether Americans and Soviets can frame policies that are compatible, policies built on frank understanding that the competition will continue in many forms but that it must be pursued with greater restraint than has been shown in the past.

5. Both sides are wary but the encouraging evidence of recent months is that both sides can change. General Secretary Gorbachev seems to appreciate that, as a nation of immigrants, America is concerned about Soviet limits on the right of individuals to emigrate. At the same time, President Reagan has been telling Americans that their attitudes toward the Soviet Union should take account of the new themes sounded by Mr. Gorbachev. Both sides are expressing a willingness to respect each other's particular security requirements, and the INF arrangements for verification indicate that the two governments can devise concrete procedures to prevent cheating --- and, equally important, to reduce the fear of cheating. Given wise leadership, changes in policies and attitudes can make it possible for quite different political systems to find common ground on essential matters that affect the fate of

both.

6. A basic challenge: How can each side demonstrate to the other that it will not exploit regional conflicts to gain political advantage? How can we get the superpowers working together to dampen and resolve such conflicts, rather than against each other in ways that exacerbate them? Not realistic to expect can always do so, but need to strive for Soviet-American cooperation in settling such regional disputes, for example, in the Persian Gulf area. Not within our power to end the Iran-Iraq war, but it is within our power to create incentives for the parties to end it.

As Secretary Shultz put it, "things have changed tremendously in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union." We are not naive, but we intend to do everything possible to build on that change, to seek ways to bridge our differences and reduce the political antagonisms that continue to divide us.

1. Soviet Premier Gorbachev is making a major effort to increase both trade and investments between our country and the Soviet Union. Do you think this is a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?

74% - good thing

22% - bad thing

2. How much confidence do you have that Ronald Reagan will deal effectively with Mikhail Gorbachev in their upcoming Summit meeting -- A great deal, some, not much at all?

30% - great deal

44% - some

25% - not much

1 undecided

The same question asked before Iceland:

33% - great deal

46% - Some

19% - not much

1 undecided

3. Who do you believe will gain most from the upcoming Summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union?

35% - U.S.

39% - USSR

27% - Both

4. From what you have heard or read, which country is stronger militarily?

U.S. - 41%

USSR - 46%

Same question asked before Iceland:

U.S. - 53%

USSR - 33%

5. Unlike the past, the US is now dealing with the Soviets from a position of strength, and for that reason, we can move more speedily with the Soviets toward more breakthroughs in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

71% - Agree

26% - Disagree

6. Our SDI is the only insurance policy we have that the Soviets will reduce the number of their nuclear ballistic missiles.

56% - Agree

38% - Disagree

7. The Soviets are using the Summit meeting purely for the purpose of propaganda.

43% - Agree

54% - Disagree

8. Now that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev will meet in Washington to sign an agreement which will reduce the number of intermediate nuclear weapons, we have taken the first steps since the end of World War Two to really slow down the arms race.

73% - Agree

24% - Disagree

9. We must make very sure that the Soviet Union is keeping all of its present treaty agreements with the United States before we sign any new treaties.

88% - Agree

11% - Disagree

10. Suppose you learned that the Soviet Union is already building a giant laser station, like our proposed SDI, that may be able to damage American satellites or destroy our missiles. Would you then favor or oppose the United States moving ahead with SDI?

71% - Move ahead

25% - Not move ahead

Talking Points for the President's Use in Calls on
Bahrain STINGER Issue to Key Senators

- Calling to express my deep concern about DeConcini amendment barring sale of STINGER missiles to friendly Gulf states.
- Ban would seriously damage successful Gulf strategy which has won strong support of Prime Minister Shamir as well as strengthened Arab moderates to resist Iranian and Soviet pressures in the Gulf. It would undercut the United States on eve of Summit where we will be confronting Soviets over their support for Iran.
- It would devastate relationship with Bahrain, which has done more than any other Gulf state to support U.S. military; and could cause other Gulf states to reduce essential support for our military.
- Fully share Congressional concern about preventing diversion of STINGER into hostile hands. Reliable safeguards remain absolute condition of any sale. We want to see sensible legislation passed which spells this out, although in practice we are already doing it.
- Frank Carlucci and Bill Crowe prepared discuss this issue with you in more detail. Want to work out mutually acceptable solution. Hope we can count on your help.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS F04-075#5
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/9/06

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

November 30, 1987

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President has designated Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anantoly Dobrynin, and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander Yakolev as distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and accordingly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3056 (a), you are hereby directed to provide United States Secret Service protection to them from December 7, 1987 until their departure from the United States.

Sincerely,



Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

September 15, 1986

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President has designated Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze as a distinguished foreign visitor to the United States and accordingly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3056 (a), you are hereby directed to provide United States Secret Service protection to him from September 15, 1986 until his departure from the United States.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Donald T. Regan". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Donald" and last name "Regan" clearly distinguishable.

Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff to the
President of the United States

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, DC 20220

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AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

NOV 23 9 03 AM '87

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November 20, 1987


Dear Mr. Secretary:

During General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to the United States, his delegation will include the following Soviet high ranking protectees: Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A. Yakovlev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A. Dobrynin.

The Soviet side would like to ask you to help in arranging that their protection be insured by the United States Secret Service (USSS).

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,


Yuri V. DUBININ

The Honorable
George P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
Washington

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E04-075#6

BY CN NARA DATE 8/5/04

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BAKER CARLUCCI COURTNEY DUBERSTEIN GRISCOM SDO STEVENS

-PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? SECRET <DTG? 231602Z NOV 87

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN SWITZERLAND

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2983
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 19006
NODIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR HOWARD BAKER, STATE FOR JOHN WHITEHEAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), PEPR, UR, US

SUBJECT: PLANNING FOR GORBACHEV HILL APPEARANCE

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. WE HAVE GIVEN SHEVARDNADZE A DESCRIPTION (PARA 4) OF THE
FLOW OF WEDNESDAY MORNING EVENTS THAT YOU WORKED OUT WITH THE
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.

3. THE OPEN DISCUSSION IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT A "JOINT
SESSION" HAS PUT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP VERY MUCH ON THE SPOT.
SHEVARDNADZE INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO
ACCEPT

THIS FORMAT, NOR DOES GORBACHEV. IT MUST BE DECIDED, HE
SAID,

"BY CONSENSUS."

4. BEGIN TEXT OF DESCRIPTION:

GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

MEETS JOINTLY WITH

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND OF THE SENATE

MOST OF THE WEDNESDAY MORNING IS TO BE SPENT IN AN
UNPRECEDENTED SERIES OF THREE MEETINGS:

- THE GENERAL SECRETARY WILL BE ESCORTED BY THE PRESIDENT
TO

THE CAPITOL BUILDING FOR AN INFORMAL MEETING WITH THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

LEADERSHIP OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS.

- HE WILL THEN BE ESCORTED TO THE CANNON BUILDING ON THE HOUSE SIDE OF CAPITOL HILL AND INTRODUCED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE TO A MEETING, WHICH WILL BE ATTENDED JOINTLY BY A LARGE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF BOTH THE HOUSE AND SENATE. ALL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE ARE INVITED. THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S ADDRESS TO THIS GROUP IS TO BE TELEVISED.

- THE GENERAL SECRETARY WILL THEN BE ESCORTED TO THE RUSSELL BUILDING ON THE SENATE SIDE OF CAPITOL HILL, WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, PARTICULARLY THOSE MEMBERS HAVING COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS RELEVANT TO THE RATIFICATION OF TREATIES. THIS WILL BE AN INFORMAL MEETING WITH A QUESTION AND ANSWER FORMAT.

- THE GENERAL SECRETARY WILL THEN RETURN TO THE WHITE HOUSE AT THE END OF THE MORNING FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

END TEXT.

SHULTZ

BT

#9006

~~SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

11/12/87

TO: MHB

FR: Tom Buscom (Hue Tick)

There is nothing in US-Soviet
Summitry where an American
President was permitted to address a
Soviet entity on a par with a
Congressional joint ~~meeting~~ meeting.
The closest thing was Nixon in
1974 being permitted to make a
simulcast (radio/TV broadcast) to
the Soviet people.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
91216

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CRB NARA, Date 8/3/04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

FRANK C. CARLUCCI *FC*

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive --
Organizing for the Summit

Attached for your signature is a National Security Decision Directive promulgating the organizational scheme we have developed to prepare for your summit with Gorbachev. It relies largely on existing organs: the NSPG, PRG, and SACG for policy substance. To manage scheduling and other mechanics we shall recreate the group co-chaired by Tom Griscom and Colin Powell that worked well prior to Venice, called the Summit Preparations Group.

This scheme has been presented to the relevant agencies, who posed no objections, and we are already implementing it. We are also working on an NSDD which lays out your policy objectives for the summit, thereby providing guidance to the action agencies.

In accordance with NSDD-266, Paul Stevens, NSC Legal Adviser, has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the National Security Decision Directive.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed NSDD on Organizing for the Summit

Prepared by:
Fritz W. Ermarth

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
91216

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority S. Tilley, NSC 12/20/91 (F87-1035)
BY COB, NARA, Date 8/3/04

ORGANIZING FOR THE SUMMIT WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV (U)

To prepare for the visit of General Secretary Gorbachev, it is necessary to establish the organizational mechanism for the conduct of preparations by the White House and coordinating the support of the Department of State and other agencies. (U)

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

The NSPG will review all policy positions relevant to the summit. I plan to chair an NSPG just prior to Thanksgiving to review the status of our preparations. Other NSPG meetings will be called as necessary. (U)

The SACG, for arms control issues, and the PRG, for issues other than arms control, both chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will be used to develop policy positions and papers for NSPG consideration. Meetings of the SACG will be staffed by Colonel Robert Linhard, and of the PRG, by Mr. Fritz Ermarth, who shall convene standing or ad hoc interagency working groups as needed. The chairman of the PRG/SACG may form other interagency groups as necessary. (U)

SUMMIT PREPARATIONS

Under the direction of the the Chief of Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Summit Preparation Group, co-chaired by Tom Griscom and Colin Powell, will coordinate all administrative, scheduling, logistic, protocol, security, public diplomacy, and legislative activities. The SPG will include senior representatives from State, USIA, NSC, and appropriate White House offices. Marybel Batjer, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC, will serve as Executive Director of the SPG. (U)

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2

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(C)

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SYSTEM II
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED


White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997

By CD3 NARA, Date 8/3/04

November 5, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive --
Organizing for the Summit

Attached for your signature is a National Security Decision Directive promulgating the organizational scheme we have developed to prepare for your summit with Gorbachev. It relies largely on existing organs: the NSPG, PRG, and SACG for policy substance. To manage scheduling and other mechanics we shall recreate the group co-chaired by Tom Griscom and Colin Powell that worked well prior to Venice, called the Summit Preparations Group.

This scheme has been presented to the relevant agencies, who posed no objections, and we are already implementing it. We are also working on an NSDD which lays out your policy objectives for the summit, thereby providing guidance to the action agencies.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	That you sign the National Security Decision Directive.
_____	_____	

Attachment

Tab A Proposed NSDD on Organizing for the Summit

Prepared by:
Fritz W. Ermarth

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff (2)

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SYSTEM II
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority S. Tilley, NSC 12/20/91 (F87-1035)
BY EDB, NARA, Date 8/3/04

ORGANIZING FOR THE SUMMIT WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV (U)

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(S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM ON SUMMIT

FROM: TOM GRISCOM

THEMES

The points that have to be developed are:

- INF Treaty, its importance, illustration of RR leadership, impact on the future and future generations
- Ratification, success rather than failure
- Verification, stick to the agreement, good deal and can make sure stays a good deal
- SDI, sign of strength, toughness in bargaining, look to future, commitment to defend and not to offend
- START, continued look to future, the next step in removing weapons
- ** This all leads to the fact that the President was patient, sees the promises he envisioned being fulfilled and looks to the future and future generations

OUTLINE

- Pre-Summit: Focus more on the President setting the tone and direction; support comes primarily from Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, Baker, Adelman (we drive the messages)
- Summit: The Event that sets the tone
- Post-Summit: Focus more on other spokesmen to talk about the positives of the treaty, what it could lead to in the future, eye toward START/SDI

SUGGESTED EVENTS

- November 3: Congressional briefing
- November 5: Lord Carrington (NATO impact)

November 12: Conservatives meeting

November 16: D.C. speech; meeting with political activists

November 17: Republican & Democrat policy lunches

November 20: Pre-Brief at Pentagon/Go to Camp David from Pentagon; news columnists

November 23: Nixon/Ford/Carter meeting; tape Thanksgiving Day message

November 24: Travel day to California
Go to location where SDI research underway, such as Denver; do tour and then address regular citizen lunch

November 26: Thanksgiving Day message broadcast (offer to Soviets)

November 28: Briefing session at Ranch

November 30: Broad-based meeting: business, labor, etc.

December 1: Travel day to South
Go to high school audience and talk about future and impact treaty will have on future citizens

December 3: Human rights event

December 4: Network anchors interview

December 7-9: Summit (see attachment)

December 10: Congressional briefing with foreign affairs and armed services members

December 11: South Lawn send-off for President

December 14: Press Conference

December 16: Thatcher & Kohl and follow-up press and congressional meetings

December 17: Presidential candidates (Republican/Democrat) briefing